Denbora eta egia KojÃ¨veren gogoetan

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Autoría:

Markos Zapiain Agirre

Director/a:

Jose Lorenzo Azurmendi Otaegi

Universidad:

Universidad del País Vasco

Facultad:

Facultad de Filosofía y Ciencias de la Educación

Departamento:

Filosofía

Área:

Filosofía

Año:

2004

| Tesiak Kojève bi bereizten ditu.
a-Lehen Kojèverentzat, hogeita hamarreko hamarraldian, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel idatzi zuena, denbora gizakiak Izateari eragindako erauzketa da.
Lehen Kojèverenean, adimenaren kemen itzelak existentziaren eta esentziaren artean burutzen duen bereiztea miragarria da, naturak agindutakoaren aurkakoa delako.
Lehen Kojèvek garbi nabaritzen du bigarrenak esango duenaren kontrakoa, hots, kontuan hartu behar dugula esentzia bere euskarri naturaletik bereiztea ez dela naturaren baitan berez gertatzen den zerbait, adimenaren jardueraren ondorio baizik, edo oinarrian adimenaren erabateko ahalmena duen giza lanarena.
Bigarren Kojèverentzat, berriz, gauza naturala izen bilakarazten duen giza ekintzak aurretik izaera bereziko prozesu bat eskatzen du, "prozesu orokortzaile¿ deritzona, berezkoa, gauzaren esentzia bereizten duena dagoen kokagunetik eta dirauen aldi tartetik. Prozesu hauxe da Introduction à la lecture de Hegel-en aintzat hartu ez zuena. Orduan, lehen Kojèvek, esentzia existentziatik bereiztea bera ere giza ekintza zela zioen.
Aldiz, berrogeita hamarreko hamarraldiko bigarren Kojève honek Le Concept, le Temps et le Discours liburuan idatziko duenez, aipatu prozesua berez gertatzen da, eta gizakiaren zeregina esentzia izen bilakatzera du mugatzen. Hauxe litzateke "bigarren Kojève¿ deitu dugunaren jarrera mintzoaren denboraz den bezainbatean.
Bigarren Kojèverentzat, prozesu orokortzailea gauza orok beti eta edonon ezinbestean eta pasiboki "jasan¿ behar duen prozesu bat da, ez da gauzatik at den edonork nahiz edozerk aktiboki "ezarririkoa¿. Bigarren Kojèvek dioenez, existitze hutsak eragiten dio gauzari prozesu hori. Izan ere, gauza, hemen eta orain baten baitan kokaturik dago; baina, aldi berean, bere existentziaren edo iraupenaren une bakoitzean, hemen eta orain horietatik bereizi egiten da, iraute hutsaren kariaz. Beste era batera esateko, gauza batek denboran zehar irautea aski izango da, abstrakzio prozesu orokortzaile horrek gauza hori izen baten adiera izateko gai bilaka dezan. Horrexegatik esan dezakegu hain zuzen izena dirauen gauzari "dagokiola¿. Edonola ere, gauza bera da prozesua jasaten duena, irauten hasten denetik eta denboran barrena dirauen bitartean, eta iraute hutsa dela zio gainera.
b-Bigarrenik, "Tyrannie et Sagesse¿ ("Tirania eta jakinduria¿) testua idatzi garaian, 1952 inguruan, Kojèvek, bigarren Kojèvek, dio, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel-en erradikaltasuna bareturik, hogeita hamarreko hamarraldian Hegel benetako jakintsu orojakile legez aurkezten baitzuen, jakintsu orojakilea oraingoz ez dela ideal filosofiko bat baizik, eta ez politikoaren aurrez aurre jarri ahalko genukeen errealitate historiko bat. Kojèvek orain, horrenbestez, definizioaren araberako filosofoa hartuko du aintzat, hau da, egiaren eta jakituriaren bila dabilena, eta ez jadanik aurkitua duena: lehen Kojèverentzat, hortaz, jakintsu orojakilea eta Historiaren amaiera jadanik gauzatuta zeuden; bigarren Kojèvek dioenez, berriz, jakintsu orojakileak ideal filosofiko bat izaten jarraitzen du, ez da errealitate historiko izatera heldu eta Historia bera ondorioz ez da oraindik burutu.
c-Lehen Kojèvek jendaurrean egite zuen Stalinen alde eta gizakiaren alde suntsitzaile, ebakitzaile, hiltzailea nabaritzen zuen.
Stalin 1953an hil zen. Berrogeita hamarreko hamarralditik aurrera, ezinbestean ebaki, suntsitu eta hil beharra zeharo baztertu eta zer gertatzen ote den une baten eta hurrengo unearen "artean¿ eta gisako gai metafisiko eta arinagoak aztertuko ditu.
d-Zeri lotu "Kehre¿ edo biraketa hori? Hitz beste egin zuen, besterik gabe, eta antropologiatik ontologiara igarotzeak beti dakar mintzamoldea baretzea, Heideggerren kasuan bezala? Hala ere, hitz beste egite hori, baretze hori, naziekiko zein Stalinekiko lotura filosofiko nabarmenegiak (hizkeraren biolentziak erakutsiak) askatu nahiak ekarriko zuen agian, izan zedin kalkuluagatik (irabazleen The dissertation distinguishes between two Kojèves.
a. For the first Kojève of the 1930s who wrote Introduction à la lecture de Hegel, time is an abstraction performed by man from the Dasein.
This first Kojève finds the tremendous power of the mind to differentiate between existence and essence amazing because it goes against nature.
The first Kojève clearly recognises the opposite of what the second one would say, namely, that we must take into account that the distinction between essence and its natural support is not something that happens of itself in nature, but only as a result of intellectual activity or of human effort based on the absolute power of the mind.
In contrast, the second Kojève considered that a prerequisite of the human act which turns a natural entity into a name is a process of a special nature, a ""generalising process"", which distinguishes the essence of a thing from its location in space and time. This process is what he did not acknowledge in Introduction à la lecture de Hegel, where he said that the very differentiation between essence and existence was a human act.
On the contrary, the second Kojève of the 1950s was to write in Le Concept, le Temps et le Discours that the aforementioned process takes place spontaneously; he limits man's function to that of turning an essence into a name. This seems to be the so-called ""second Kojève""'s view as regards the time of speech.
For the second Kojève, the generalisation process is a process that all things must of necessary ""undergo"" always and everywhere, not something actively ""imposed"" by anybody or anything from outside the thing. As the second Kojève says, mere existence subjects the thing to that process. For the thing is located in a here-and-now; but at the same time its existence or permanence is differentiated from those here-and-nows by the very fact of permanence. In other words, the continued existence of a thing through time is sufficent to make it possible for the generalisation process to turn the thing into a meaning for a name. Indeed that is why we can say that the name ""belongs"" to the thing. In any case, it is the thing itself that undergoes the process from the time it starts to exist and for as long as it continues to exist through time, by virtue of its very endurance.
b. In the second place, in the period when he wrote "Tyrannie et Sagesse¿, around about 1952, Kojève (the second Kojève), having overcome the radicalism of Introduction à la lecture de Hegel where he had presented Hegel as truly omniscient wisdom, now says that omniscient wisdom is nothing but a philosophical ideal, not a historical reality to be confronted with political reality. Thus Kojève now accepts the philosopher according to his definition, that is, as one who searches for truth and knowledge rather than as one who has already found it: for the first Kojève omniscient wisdom and the end of History had already happened; whereas according to the second Kojève, omniscient wisdom remains a philosophical ideal, it has not come to be as a historical reality, and consequently, History has not yet ended.
c. The first Kojève defended Stalin publicly and emphasised the man's ruthless, destructive aspect.
Stalin died in 1953. From the fifties onward, with the imperious necessity to set aside once and for all the ruthless and destructive, we look at what happened in the ""gap"" between the one stage and the other, and some other metaphysical and not-so-serious matters of this nature.
d. To what should this ""Kehre"" or turnaround be linked? Did he just change his language, with the inevitable moderation of expression brought about by the transition from anthropology to ontology, as in Heidegger's case? However, might not that moderation have been the result of a wish to dissociate himself from overly obvious philosophical links with the Nazis or Stalin (manifested by his violence of language), whether by

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